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Following an analysis of the state of investigations and clinical outcomes in the Alzheimer’s research field, I 
argue that the widely-accepted ‘amyloid cascade’ mechanistic explanation of Alzheimer’s disease appears to 
be fundamentally incomplete. In this context, I propose that a framework termed ‘principled mechanism’ (PM) 
can help with remedying this problem. First, using a series of five ‘tests’, PM systematically compares different 
components of a given mechanistic explanation against a paradigmatic set of criteria, and hints at various 
ways of making the mechanistic explanation more ‘complete’. These steps will be demonstrated using the 
amyloid explanation, and its missing or problematic mechanistic elements will be highlighted. Second, PM 
makes an appeal for the discovery and application of ‘biological principles’, which approximate ceteris paribus 
laws and are operative at the level of a biological cell. As such, although thermodynamic, evolutionary, 
ecological and other laws or principles from chemistry and the broader life sciences could inform them, 
biological principles should be considered ontologically unique. These principles could augment different 
facets of the mechanistic explanation but also allow further independent nomological explanation of the 
phenomenon. Whilst this overall strategy can be complementary to certain ‘New Mechanist’ approaches, an 
important distinction of the PM framework is its equal attention to the explanatory utility of biological principles. 
Lastly, I detail two hypothetical biological principles, and show how they could each inform and improve the 
potentially incomplete mechanistic aspects of the amyloid explanation and also how they could provide 
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This paper aims to show the practical utility of the ‘principled mechanism’ (PM) account on a current case in 
biomedicine, namely, on the field of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) research. As will be detailed throughout the 
paper, PM is a model of biological explanation that supplements mechanistic elements with ‘principles’, where 
the latter are thought of as non-accidental generalisations that may nevertheless fall short of full-blown 
lawhood. As for the subject matter, AD studies represent an active area of investigation with clear clinical and 
biological implications. In the philosophy of biology literature, there are (to the extent of what the research for 
this paper has revealed)1 no examples of a thorough analysis of AD research; and the few AD-focused 
accounts that do exist concern, for instance, the idea of a “genetic cause” using the example of AD (Dekkers 
& Rikkert, 2006; Nordenfelt, 2006) or the subject of selfhood in AD patients (Kontos, 2004). 
 
 The paper is structured to provide a philosophical case study of the disease, centred on three 
questions: (i) what is the current problem with AD research and why do we face this problem? (Section 2); (ii) 
why might contemporary philosophical accounts of mechanism in biology not offer tractable solutions to 
adequately confront this challenge? (Section 3); and, (iii) what can the PM framework offer instead to move 
in a more productive direction (Sections 4–6)? 
 
 The AD field is broad and varied, and I have tried, to the extent possible, to sufficiently represent the 
current breadth of research whilst also staying on point. I aim to explicate the following answers to the above 
questions: First, the AD field is, for the most part, of one voice when it comes to the central elements of a 
mechanistic explanation that has motivated research in the field for the past three decades. The AD 
mechanistic model and resultant explanation are greatly detailed (and increasingly so by the day). However, 
the explanation — despite immense effort — has not translated into the clinic for patients, and many clinical 
trials have been unsuccessful. I argue that this is not due to challenges in clinical ‘translations’ of the 
explanation’s predictions, but rather to a fundamental problem with the way in which mechanistic explanations 
are approached in the field. 
 
 Second, I argue that the solution to this problem is not to simply do away with mechanistic 
explanations, for there is no serious replacement for this explanatory type in biomedicine. The solution should 
build on the existing mechanistic explanations. Moreover, whilst sympathetic to the “New Mechanist” (NM) 
project in the philosophy of scientific explanation, I provide several strands of argument to the effect that 
existing NM accounts, to the extent that they go beyond reflecting current biological practice, may not be 
sufficiently critical of that practice to be used to help resolve the problem set out in this paper. Third, I will 
propose that a series of ‘paradigmatic’ tests can, as an initial strategy, point to elements within a given 
mechanistic explanation that could make it more comprehensive and generate new empirical questions. As a 
next step, I will argue that the addition of biological principles that could govern or apply to the elements 
highlighted in the tests can make the overall explanation richer, and the potential understanding of AD 
pathobiology more fundamental. 
 
1 Of note, a relevant recent philosophical work presents a framework called ‘MecCog’ that builds mechanism 




 Before proceeding further, I will address two important concerns in Section 1, namely, what range of 
mechanistic concepts the paper makes use of, and why AD is well-suited for the purpose of this case study. 
 
 
1. Usage of mechanistic concepts, and context of AD research in biology 
 
Perusing current biomedical journals would leave little doubt that the search for ‘mechanisms’ forms the basis 
of a great proportion of the research effort. However, there is much ambiguity in the intended meaning of 
mechanistic concepts and terms in the biological literature (Marder, 2020). This might partly be attributable to 
the impression that ‘mechanism’ could be said to be taken as a primitive concept in biology (much like ‘point’ 
or ‘line’ in geometry (Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018, p. 373)) — a notion on which much else relies, but one which 
is refractory to a simple and universal definition. It goes without saying that philosophers of mechanism have 
studied these topics extensively, but this literature has not yet found its way into mainstream biomedical 
research. For our purposes here, however, the intended terminological meanings should be crystallised. 
 
1.1. Actual mechanisms, mechanistic models and mechanistic explanations 
 
Consider the statement “the bacterium Helicobacter pylori can lead to (or cause) peptic ulcers”. Here, ‘peptic 
ulcer’ is the phenomenon to be explained (henceforth the ‘phenomenon’). Moreover, H. pylori is a putative 
cause, or a causative agent. One could then ask why H. pylori causes peptic ulcers. Perhaps because this is 
its function in the gastrointestinal environment. The question could be rephrased as: how or by what means 
does H. pylori cause peptic ulcers? The ‘how’ or the ‘means’ with which a putative causative agent leads to a 
phenomenon can be called the actual mechanism by which the phenomenon arises (henceforth the 
‘mechanism’).2 To avoid confusion, I take the word ‘mechanism’ to indicate our assumption about the work 
that causes or produces a phenomenon.3 
 
 Now, we can model a mechanism. One can take a model to be some representation of reality (or a 
phenomenon), and it can be used as a heuristic or thinking tool, or as part of a broader explanation, or perhaps 
as a way to simplify the complexity of the phenomenon. There are different accounts of how a model does the 
‘representing’, but I will not expand on them here.4 In molecular biology, cellular processes are often 
represented using a network of parts (e.g. proteins, genes, RNAs, etc.), indications of change and movement 
(e.g. of a protein from one location to another), interactions (e.g. protein–protein, protein–DNA, protein–lipid), 
and so on. Therefore, we can define a mechanistic model as a representation of a mechanism. It follows that 
a given mechanism could have multiple different representations. 
 
 
2 There are distinctions to be made between mechanistic and ‘difference-making’ accounts of causation, but I will 
not delve into the topic here. 
3 The reason why this assumption may not apply across the board is that in some cases using ‘mechanism’ as a 
stand-in for ‘means’ may strike as odd: e.g. when referring to the means with which a magnetic pole attracts a 
magnet, talking about ‘mechanism’ is unusual; rather, we could talk of magnetic ‘fields’ and ‘forces’. 
4 As an example, a candidate for how models represent has been called the ‘DEKI’ account, entailing four elements: 




 Mechanistic models can subsequently be used as part of a statement or description to detail and give 
reasons for a phenomenon (see e.g. (Brini, Simmerling, & Dill, 2020)). Let us call this the mechanistic account 
or mechanistic explanation. A mechanistic model could give rise to several explanations, which can be used 
by investigators for predictions, molecular interventions, etc. (Lombrozo, 2011). 
 
 Three caveats are necessary: First, some studies in cellular biology may stop at the stage of detailing 
certain elements of a model, and not progress to a full-fledged mechanistic explanation. For our purposes 
here, however, the explanatory stage is key. Second, biologists investigating a cellular phenomenon may at 
times suffice to provide an analysis of the putative function of a ‘part’, such as a protein, and only provide a 
version of a ‘functional’ explanation. As will also be seen later in the context of AD, this should indeed be 
viewed as complementary to mechanistic explanations (see also (Theurer, 2018)). And third, I am not claiming 
that all explanations require a model, but that mechanistic explanations typically use at least some elements 
of mechanistic models. 
 
1.2. AD research as a quintessential mechanistic research programme 
 
AD poses a huge burden on patients and their families. Worldwide, the projected number of dementia cases 
(a majority of which is thought to be AD) is estimated to reach over 131.5 million affected individuals by 2050 
(Editors, 2016).  Why is AD a suitable research field to study the theoretical basis behind mechanistic 
explanations? First, there has now been more than 50 years of systematic research on AD, and a vast portion 
of the published works refer to “disease mechanism”, “mechanistic understanding”, “mechanistic pathways” 
and many other related concepts. The current cellular understanding of AD is complex to the point that a lot 
can be said about its various facets, its strengths and its shortcomings. Furthermore, a well-accepted and 
overarching mechanistic explanation has been the mainstay of the field for several decades, and, importantly, 
it has been tested in different lights, i.e. in countless laboratory-based assays all the way to many clinical trials. 
So, what exactly is the problem? 
 
 
2. Problems for the mainstream biomedical research approach to AD 
 
In 1907, Alois Alzheimer (1864–1915) provided two pathological hallmarks for the disease in the brain, which 
are now widely known as amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles (Alzheimer, Stelzmann, Schnitzlein, & 
Murtagh, 1995) (these two terms will be referred to repeatedly). The hallmarks are now known to be due to the 
aggregation of two main types of ‘sticky’ proteins: the plaques are formed of amyloid beta (Aβ) peptide (mostly 
outside affected neurons), and the neurofibrillary tangles (NFTs) of tau protein (inside affected neurons). 
Focused investigations of Aβ three decades ago are what started the extensive and what one could call the 
‘mainstream’ molecular research effort on AD. What has resulted is a working explanation called the amyloid 
cascade hypothesis/mechanistic explanation (Beyreuther & Masters, 1991; Hardy & Allsop, 1991; Selkoe, 
1991), henceforth the ‘amyloid explanation’. Although many additional genes and cellular pathways have since 
been associated to varying degrees with some manifestations of the disease (see (Liu, Xie, Meng, & Kang, 




2.1. The amyloid cascade mechanistic explanation 
 
To analyse the amyloid explanation, it would help to choose an illustrative schematic that depicts both 
processes of amyloid plaque formation by Aβ and NFT formation by tau. However, note that, technically, the 
amyloid cascade hypothesis usually only refers to the amyloid plaque formation process in AD and does not 
include the NFT formation arm. Be that as it may, to simplify subsequent references to these two defining 
lesions of AD, I will use the umbrella term of ‘amyloid explanation’ to refer to both processes. 
 
 Of the available choices, a summarising figure from a review article by Panza and colleagues (Panza, 
Lozupone, Logroscino, & Imbimbo, 2019) is shown in Figure 1 on the next page and will be used as a reference 
visual for the amyloid mechanistic model. Also, to simplify the depicted illustration using text, three salient 
processes in the figure are summarised in Table 1. These are: 
(i) The amyloidogenic amyloid precursor protein (APP) processing pathway; this process 
increases the production of Aβ and the formation of amyloid plaque. 
(ii) The non-amyloidogenic APP processing pathway; this process decreases the production of 
Aβ and the formation of amyloid plaque. 
(iii) The NFT formation pathway; this process leads to the aggregation of tau. 
 
 In the figure, the lipid membrane of a neuronal cell is shown as a bilayer (two lines of circles with lines 
in between, like a horizontal ladder). The cytoplasm or intracellular space is the area below the membrane, 
shown in beige. All the area above the membrane is the extracellular space, and one more neuron and two 
other cell types in the brain (astrocytes and microglial immune cells, which act to support neurons) are 
illustrated at a much smaller size. Pathways (i) and (ii), which have to do with amyloid plaque formation, both 
start with the APP protein, which in the figure is shown as a twisting ‘tube’ that has been cut by two pairs of 
scissors. The reason for the three colours of the tube (red, orange and blue) is to show the three fragments 
(or ‘peptides’) of APP that form when it is cleaved by a number of other proteins (enzymes). 
 
 In (i) the amyloidogenic pathway, APP is cleaved by an enzyme (‘β-secretase’ or BACE, depicted as 
a pair of purple scissors above the membrane) to produce two fragments, namely ‘sAPPβ’ (in blue) and ‘C99’ 
(the part of APP that remains). The C99 fragment is then cleaved by another enzyme, ‘γ-secretase’ (depicted 
as a pair of yellow scissors within the membrane), yielding the Aβ peptide (orange fragment). Aβ ‘monomers’ 
start to aggregate to form oligomers, fibrils and plaques (shown sequentially in the extracellular space). Over 
the past decade, attention has shifted from the insoluble fibrils and plaques to the soluble oligomers as being 
the toxic Aβ form in neurons (Dear et al., 2020). These steps are summarised in the first column of Table 1. 
 
 Concomitant with (i), the (ii) non-amyloidogenic pathway is also proposed to be taking place on the 
cell membrane with respect to APP. Specifically, in this pathway, rather than initially being cleaved by β-
secretase, APP is cleaved by ‘α-secretase’ at a different site, leading to the production of a soluble fragment 
called ‘sAPPα’ and preventing Aβ peptide production. Because this pathway is supposed to be a ‘physiologic’ 




in the second column of Table 1. In AD, the balance between these two pathways is thought to be skewed 
toward the amyloidogenic route. In other words, more of process (i) and less of process (ii) take place. 
 
 
Figure 1. Putative pathobiological mechanistic model of Alzheimer’s disease (Panza et al., 2019). Here 
the authors show the process of amyloid plaque formation outside the neuronal cell, and the generation of 
neurofibrillary tangles inside the cell, along with “mechanisms of action of the main anti-amyloid-β (Aβ) drugs that 
are currently in phase III clinical development for the treatment of Alzheimer disease”. The intracellular endpoint 
depicted is mitochondrial damage, whereas the extracellular endpoints shown are neuronal damage, microglial 
dysfunction and reactive astrocytes. Abbreviations, as per the original caption, are: AICD, amyloid precursor 
protein intracellular domain; BACE, β-secretase; sAPPβ, soluble amyloid precursor protein-β. Reproduced with 
permission from Springer Nature. 
 
 
Pathway (iii) concerns the intracellular formation of NFT, where the central player is the tau protein. 
Tau is mainly found in the axons (long projections) of neurons and is physiologically associated with promoting 
the assembly of microtubules. Microtubules are polymers of ‘tubulin’ proteins and form part of the cytoskeleton: 
they provide structure to the cell and aid in other functions. In Figure 1, a microtubule is depicted as a purple 




wrapping around the microtubule. In the AD amyloid explanation (and indeed other neurodegenerative 
conditions involving tau), the tau protein, which is modified in the cell by the attachment of a ‘phosphoryl’ 
chemical group (i.e. is said to be ‘phosphorylated’) on a number of its amino acids, becomes 
hyperphosphorylated, indicating that multiple sites on the protein become saturated with phosphorylation. It is 
thought that tau hyperphosphorylation leads to its dissociation from microtubules, in turn leading to microtubule 
disintegration and the formation of tau aggregates (both depicted in the figure). These aggregates can turn 
into NFTs and may even spread to other neurons (not shown in the figure), causing further NFTs to form in a 
given brain region. The steps in this pathway are summarised in the last column of the table. 
 
 










Neurofibrillary Tangle Formation 
 
Increased in AD 
 
 
Reduced in AD 
 
Increased in AD 
 
START 
o Amyloid Precursor Protein 
(APP) 
PROCESS 
1. Cleavage by protease β-
secretase 1 (BACE1) 
PRODUCTS 





2. Cleavage of C99 by 
protease γ-secretase 
PRODUCTS 
o Release of Aβ peptide (40- 
or 42-amino-acid length) 
o Aggregation of Aβ to form 
oligomers, protofibrils, 




o Amyloid Precursor Protein 
(APP) 
PROCESS 
1. Cleavage by extracellular 
protease α-secretase 
PRODUCT 




o Microtubule-associated tau 
protein 
PROCESS 
1. Hyperphosphorylation of 
tau 
PRODUCTS 
o Aggregation of 
hyperphosphorylated tau 
o NFT formation 
 
ENDPOINT 
o Synapse loss and neuronal death mediated by Aβ oligomers 
 
ENDPOINTS 
o Cytoskeletal changes and 
disruption of axonal 
transport 
o Spread of 
misfolded/aggregated tau 




5 The steps in Table 1 are extensively simplified, given that for each step multiple details and subtleties have been 
reported. One such important detail, for example, is the varying clearance of Aβ by ‘apolipoprotein E’ (APOE) 
proteins (Yamazaki, Zhao, Caulfield, Liu, & Bu, 2019). In fact, variants of APOE are genetic risk factors for late-onset 




The amyloid explanation revolves around these protein aggregation events, with the end result being 
neuronal loss and cognitive impairment. What happens in the brain at a cortical level (i.e. populations of 
neurons and brain regions) is beyond the current discussion, as we are concerned with the more immediate 
task of accounting for processes at the cellular level. Nonetheless, attention in the field has been directed for 
more than a decade now toward a region of the brain called the entorhinal cortex as perhaps the initial part of 
the brain suffering from the loss of its neurons (NTNU, 2020; Shugart, 2020). 
 
The elucidation of each of the mentioned three pathways has been a major advance in the field, and 
for instance in the case of tau aggregation, research on its mechanistic details has been featured on the cover 
of Nature as recently as November 2019. This shows the importance with which deciphering AD’s pathobiology 
has been judged not just by the AD research field but also by the broader scientific community. 
 
What might now be apparent is that a conceptual gap that the amyloid explanation needs to address 
is, for example, how pathways i and ii interact and influence pathway iii. The nonamyloidogenic pathway is 
supposedly a normal physiological process, whereas the amyloidogenic pathway is pronounced in disease. 
Yet, to a certain extent, both are taking place in health and disease. Moreover, pathway iii (involving tau 
aggregates) has been identified to have non-neurodegenerative manifestations as well (Park et al., 2020), and 
to also participate in normal physiologic processes in, for example, hibernating animals (Arendt et al., 2003). 
The picture is therefore complicated in various ways. Having said that, this is not a complication that would, at 
least conceptually, pose a problem for current frameworks within the philosophy of biology to address. For us, 
the nub of the problem is more fundamental than how the various pathways may interact. 
 
2.2. Capturing the full complexity of the disease 
 
Up to this day, the amyloid explanation has actually been quite successful in a certain sense: details of various 
aspects of the underlying working model continue to be worked out by different groups, clinical trials are 
designed based on the explanation, and the ‘tenet’ of the explanation (i.e. the theme of protein aggregation 
inside and outside neurons) remains quite intact. As mentioned earlier, even when alternative explanations 
are proposed for AD, they are often pinned to the amyloid explanation. As a case in point, there has been an 
ongoing interest in the possibility of a microbial link to AD (Cairns et al., 2020), and whether Aβ has 
antimicrobial properties (Pastore, Raimondi, Rajendran, & Temussi, 2020). But when an “antimicrobial 
protection hypothesis” was proposed to account for these possibilities, the authors commented that “the new 
model extends but remains broadly consistent with the Amyloid Cascade Hypothesis and overwhelming data 
showing the primacy of Aβ in AD pathology” (Moir, Lathe, & Tanzi, 2018, p. 1602). It might be safe to say that 
the amyloid explanation has, in a way, stood the test of time. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine a radically 
different mechanistic explanation that could circumvent the current one, and the AD hallmarks, altogether. 
 
Nonetheless, there is in fact a fundamental and consequential problem with the amyloid explanation, 
and it is that the explanation has not led to genuine clinical improvement in patients. This reality is highlighted 
when we consider the many clinical trials that have tested what were meant to be ‘disease-modifying’ 




radically rethink our approach to Alzheimer’s research”, Mark Hammond and Tim Newton write that “over the 
past decade we’ve seen failure after failure in clinical trials for neurodegenerative disease [and] despite over 
200 clinical trials, we still don’t have any meaningful therapeutics for Alzheimer’s” (Hammond & Newton, 2020). 
This does not stem from the way in which the mechanistic explanation is being translated from ‘bench to 
bedside’. Practicable strategies already exist in biology to deal with the problem of translation (see e.g. 
(Henderson, Rieder, & Wynn, 2020)). 
 
 In fact, many of the AD therapies tested have been produced to match the understanding and 
prediction afforded by the amyloid explanation in remarkably precise ways. In other words, if the explanation 
suggests that protein ‘X’ should be lowered in patients (and this has been borne out in laboratory and animal 
experiments), the therapeutics being tested are indeed lowering that protein in patients being tested. Hence, 
the explanation’s predictions/demands are being translated all the way to patients in a strictly biological sense 
but are still not successful in halting AD.  Something might therefore be amiss with the explanation itself, in that 
it is not capturing the full complexity of AD and is somehow seriously incomplete. 
 
 It is important to note here that such problems could in fact generalise to — and are typical of — any 
other mechanistic explanation in biomedicine. In cases such as certain rare monogenic diseases, the 
explanation might have fewer identified components relative to the amyloid explanation of AD and a more 
delineated causal chain, whereas in other complex cases such as various types of cancer the mechanistic 
explanation might be much more multifaceted than that of AD. Furthermore, there might also not be a general 
consensus in the respective research field on a unified mechanistic explanation. That being said, this paper’s 
analysis could just as easily be applied to the mechanistic explanation of any pathobiological condition. 
 
 Now, how should the challenge with the amyloid explanation be approached? I will outline two 
possibilities, calling them the ‘incremental’ and the ‘non-mechanistic’ options, and then point out that my thesis 
advocates for a middle ground. To begin with, solutions proposed by some AD investigators appear to argue 
for staying within the confines of the current mechanistic framework, whilst attempting to increase our 
understanding of certain details and gaps about the workings of the model, or the timeline of clinical trials and 
interventions (Aisen, 2019; Petsko, 2018). I call this the incremental approach. An important detail requiring 
resolution, for instance, concerns Aβ, such as clarifying how its levels in patients are correlated with the stage 
of the disease (Masters, 2019), or whether it is causative of AD or a byproduct (Panza et al., 2019). 
 
The focus on details might also lead to the addition of new molecules to the explanation, which may 
eventually become therapeutic ‘targets’. However, given the long history of AD research, it is quite unlikely that 
one or more hitherto undiscovered targets waiting to be added to the mechanistic model would suddenly 
change everything. Nevertheless, I cannot ‘prove’ this, for such an outcome is in theory possible, although, as 
I have emphasised, all new details that have thus far been discovered have revolved around the amyloid 
explanation. 
 
 The incremental approach might also reveal new knowledge about the existing molecular parts of the 




stretches back hundreds of millions of years, and any key protein identified in the AD explanation (e.g. APP) 
very likely also functions in various other cellular processes that might have little to do with AD per se, therefore 
making interventions on it risky. Additionally, when investigators focus on one mechanism, a general problem 
of ‘masking’ may be encountered, whereby “the operation of one mechanism might mask or hide the operation” 
of other mechanisms (Illari, 2011, p. 146). For example, the secretase enzymes might function in as-yet-
unidentified processes in neurons that are critical to normal cognition. If that is so, the amyloid explanation 
must be able to capture these important aspects of its key protein players as well. However, there is no obvious 
path as to how the amyloid explanation can connect with other cellular mechanisms. The incremental approach 
can in principle reveal insights toward this issue, but it is not clear how exactly this would be achieved. 
 
 An opposing option relative to the one above is to look for completely non-mechanistic explanations 
for AD, but such a suggestion would be received as outlandish in cellular biology. It is inconceivable for anyone 
in biomedicine to advocate giving up the entire ‘mechanistic enterprise’ (i.e. the creation of mechanistic models 
and provision of mechanistic explanations), for there is no viable alternative to such an approach. If someone 
proposed a completely non-mechanistic approach to studying AD’s cellular phenomena — it is hard to imagine 
what this would look like, for even a purely mathematical approach would have to rely upon some ‘platform’ in 
the form of a mechanistic model — it just cannot realistically inform current research, as it would simply not 
‘connect with’ anything that investigators are pursuing. Consider also that even network-based or topological 
explanations in molecular biology are often used to search for mechanistic elements within them (see (Yadav, 
Vidal, & Luck, 2020)). What is more, the mechanistic enterprise appears to connect with at least some of our 
intuitive insights about how nature works (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). 
 
 My thesis argues for a middle way, such that the meticulous protein-aggregation-centred mechanistic 
understanding is preserved but also augmented with a ‘novel’ non-mechanistic approach so that new 
experiments would not merely bring about ‘more of the same’, but rather genuine steps forward in our 
understanding of the complexity of the disease. This is the ultimate aim of the PM framework, to help show 
how exactly the amyloid explanation might be ‘incomplete’, and how one might go about improving it. One can 
then reasonably hope that the explanation would have a better chance of actually halting the disease. 
 
 But first, before outlining the PM approach, I will look for insights toward improving the amyloid 
explanation in work by contemporary philosophers concerned with mechanistic theory. 
 
 
3. ‘New Mechanism’ and clues for moving past the explanatory problem 
 
Beginning in the 1990s, a renewed interest in mechanisms began to take shape primarily within the philosophy 
of biology. This strand of investigation is termed “New Mechanism” (NM) to distinguish it from research on the 
history of the Mechanical Philosophy. NM was a welcome development, for it aimed to systematise — and 
provide the underlying theory for — mechanistic concepts and usages that were (and for the most part still 





 A reminder of the context within which NM arose is important here. Many philosophers of science in 
the mid-twentieth century were pursuing a nomological (i.e. natural-law-based) tradition, best exemplified in 
Carl Hempel’s (1905–1997) deductive-nomological (DN) model of scientific explanation (Hempel, 1965). The 
zeitgeist of this approach can perhaps be said to have been “experiment as the source of knowledge, 
mathematical formulation as the descriptive medium [and] mathematical deduction as the guiding principle in 
the search for new phenomena to be verified by experimentation” (Dijksterhuis, 1961, p. 3). This also instilled 
a sense of valuing “rigor, precision, and generality” in scientific theorising (Bogen, 2020). 
 
 But the DN approach was problematic, even in the seemingly compatible subfields of physics. Already 
in the same period as the peak of logical empiricism, Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) was questioning the highly 
formal and axiomatic approaches to scientific theories (Kuhn, 1962), and, in the words of Simon Blackburn, 
advocated a “less formal and more contextualized approach […which] stressed the open-endedness of 
scientific activity [and] the heuristic value of analogies and models” (Blackburn, 2016, p. 475). Philosophers of 
biology also took note of such problems. William Wimsatt, who together with a group of students and 
collaborators set the stage for the NM approach, writes that in 1974, he argued that “discovering a mechanism 
as a relatively stable and manipulable articulation of causal factors better fit the activity of biologists than a 
search for laws” (Wimsatt, 2017, p. xv). 
 
 Over the past 30 years, NM philosophers have provided influential accounts with which to 
systematically conceive of mechanisms and mechanistic explanations. For example, in 1993, William Bechtel 
and Robert Richardson wrote that mechanistic research results in “a detailed account of the parts and 
operations of a mechanism and how they are organized and orchestrated in a specific model system” (Bechtel 
& Richardson, 2010, p. xli)6. Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver defined mechanisms as 
“entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish 
or termination conditions” (Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000, p. 3). Along the same lines, Bechtel and Adele 
Abrahamsen defined a mechanism as “a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, 
component operations, and their organization [where] The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is 
responsible for one or more phenomena” (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 423). Finally, Stuart Glennan and 
Phyllis Illari have written about the concept of a “minimal mechanism”, whereby “a mechanism for a 
phenomenon consists of entities (or parts) whose activities and interactions are organized so as to be 
responsible for the phenomenon” (Glennan, 2017, p. 17; Glennan & Illari, 2017, p. 92). 
 
Without going into the specifics, the way in which biologists think about the AD mechanism arguably 
matches the accounts above. Moreover, the amyloid explanation itself is attuned to the way that, for example, 
Bechtel and Richardson defined mechanistic accounts. However, it is not immediately clear based on these 
accounts how the amyloid explanation might be incomplete and how it could be improved. Depending on the 
context, the NM accounts require much more expansion to function as a critiquing framework. One could, for 
example, ‘read into’ the accounts or find elements that could be useful for our problem, but they do not provide 
explicit details for us to utilise. Part of the reason for this might be that many NM philosophers and philosophers 
of biology in general might not have concentrated on the failures present in modern cell biology. Laura Franklin-
 




Hall similarly suggests that “a too-successful enculturation of philosophers into the scientific mindset [makes] 
it difficult to achieve the critical distance needed to philosophize about science” (Franklin-Hall, 2016, p. 71). 
 
Notwithstanding these concerns, what hints could one distil from the NM approach as to what the 
amyloid explanation might be lacking? I believe such hints might become apparent when one considers how 
the NM and related approaches have dealt with ideas concerning the introduction of laws into mechanistic 
explanations. Craver and James Tabery maintain that mechanisms “seem to play the role of laws in the 
biological sciences: we seek mechanisms to explain, predict, and control phenomena in nature even if 
mechanisms lack many of the characteristics definitive of laws in the logical empiricist framework (such as 
universality, inviolable necessity, or unrestricted scope)” (Craver & Tabery, 2019). In another take, Craver and 
Marie Kaiser write that “mechanists decenter laws in their thinking about science because the old paradigm, 
centering laws, has become mired in debates that are inconsequential and, as a result, have stopped 
generating new questions and producing new results” [emphasis added] (Craver & Kaiser, 2013, p. 144). 
Whilst a goal of my thesis is to put laws back in the centre of discussion,7 I share the view of Craver and Kaiser 
in emphasising the importance of generating new empirical questions as a key criterion of a framework’s 
success. Let us call this Hint #1. 
 
Now, more compatible with the view on laws argued in this paper is that of Bechtel and Richardson, 
who also considered the place of laws or “general and abstract explanatory principles” (Bechtel & Richardson, 
2010, p. 232) in mechanistic accounts. Their main motivation here was to “question the hegemony of laws in 
explanation [but] not their existence” (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010, p. 256). In more recent work, Bechtel 
comments that “laws may be invoked to characterize the overall functioning of the mechanism or some of its 
operations, but it is the discovery that particular operations are being performed that is required to specify the 
mechanism” (Bechtel, 2011, p. 537). Congruent to this description, Nancy Cartwright, John Pemberton and 
Sarah Wieten (whose work is not usually considered part of the NM tradition) have proposed that “when a 
mechanism M gives rise to a regular behavior RB that is described in a cp [ceteris paribus] law, RB is what it 
takes for some set of principles that govern the features of M’s parts in their arrangement in M all to be 
instanced together” (Cartwright, Pemberton, & Wieten, 2020, p. 18). I will say more on ceteris paribus laws in 
Section 6. 
 
In recent work analysing examples from chronobiology (the biology of time in terms of an organism’s 
24-hour circadian rhythm), Bechtel mentions “principles of organization (design principles)” which “assert that 
any system implementing the organization will exhibit the specified behavior” (Bechtel, 2017, p. 19). Relatedly, 
Sara Green has investigated the idea of design principles in the context of ‘systems biology’ and introduced 
the idea of “constraint-based generality” (Green, 2015). Whilst my thesis is sympathetic to these accounts, 
again they do not explicitly show how the amyloid explanation should be overhauled, and the role and discovery 
of principles come across as peripheral to the specification and operations of a mechanism. I state this 
because, for instance, an AD investigator might just assume that the current amyloid explanation is already 
serving the purpose of ‘organising’ the components of the underlying model by accounting for the temporal 
 
7 Others, e.g. Bert Leuridan in (Leuridan, 2010), have also argued that laws cannot be supplanted by mechanisms 




cascade of events both inside and outside the cell. Thus, the investigator needs a convincing reason to invoke 
an extra concept, such as a ‘principle’. Nonetheless, the NM works cited in this and the preceding paragraph 
hint at an explanatory role that principles of organisation could play, at least in a qualitative sense. Let us 
consider this Hint #2. 
 
As might be expected from the often-cyclical nature of the history of ideas, as the NM approach began 
to become dominant in the philosophy of biology, there was a small but steady wave of proposals that 
reintroduced or amalgamated certain elements of the pre-NM nomological approaches. For example, José 
Díez has proposed a ‘neo-Hempelian’ account of scientific explanation, whereby “to explain a phenomenon is 
to make it expectable by introducing new conceptual/ontological machinery and using special, and non-ad hoc, 
non-accidental regularities” (Díez, 2014, p. 1413). A key notion in Díez’s account is that of ‘expectability’. Roger 
Deulofeu and Javier Suárez pick up on this notion in their paper on “when mechanisms are not enough”, and 
write that in their analysis, “the use of scientific laws is supposed to be a minimal requirement of all scientific 
explanations, since the purpose of a scientific explanation is to make phenomena expectable” (Deulofeu & 
Suárez, 2018, p. 95) [emphasis added]. 
 
In this body of literature, one of the closest approaches to the one in this paper is an account by Karina 
Alleva, Díez and Lucia Federico on a problem in biochemistry (Alleva, Diez, & Federico, 2017). The authors 
are concerned with the mechanistic description of the conformational changes in a protein upon the binding of 
another molecule (‘allosteric’ regulation). What they propose “essentially contains nonaccidental, nomological 
regularities that can properly be considered as laws in a relevant, though minimal, sense of lawhood” (Alleva 
et al., 2017, p. 12). Importantly, they say that “we do not believe that the mechanistic and our model-theoretic 
accounts are in opposition” (Alleva et al., 2017, p. 12), but rather “we advocate a plural, syncretic perspective 
in which every relevant aspect is explicated according to its specific nature” (Alleva et al., 2017, p. 13). This 
“plural, syncretic perspective” and the notion of ‘expectability’, even though originated in works which one might 
say are ‘reacting’ to the NM tradition, could still be our Hint #3. 
 
The confluence of these three hints, i.e. a framework’s ability to generate new empirical questions, an 
explanatory role for principles, and an explanation’s drive toward expectability, is a niche where the ‘principled 
mechanistic’ (PM) explanation of this paper can fit. As I shall argue, PM’s strength lies first and foremost in 
generating questions that current mechanistic explanations are not poised to produce. Furthermore, I will argue 
for an independent and critical explanatory role for ‘biological principles’. And, lastly, PM pushes for quantitative 
expectability of the phenomenon being studied. More on these in the next sections. 
 
Beyond the above hints, there are also other intersections between PM and NM. For instance, part of 
the PM framework involves creating a series of ‘tests’ to detail what a ‘paradigmatic’ PM explanation would 
look like (Section 4). For this, concepts developed in the NM literature about mechanistic elements such as 
decomposable parts, organisation and levels will be of great utility. This is why I consider the PM project to be 
complementary to NM, yet more prescriptive of what investigators ‘ought’ to be doing compared to NM when 





In closing this section, I should emphasise that my intention is not to imply that all open problems 
related to current AD research require PM, or some other augmented mechanistic framework. The purpose of 
PM is to improve the overall explanation of AD. Nonetheless, recalling the final paragraph of Subsection 2.1, 
I noted that there are open challenges pertaining to the amyloid explanation that are separate from what I 
argue to be its ‘foundational’ shortcomings. One such challenge had to do with how one could reconcile the 
involvement of pathways i, ii and iii in both physiologic and disease processes. Would, for instance, disease in 
such cases be a matter of imbalance? Accounts in NM, such as those explicating how operations within a 
mechanism might be organised or what different levels and feedback might exist in a particular mechanistic 
explanation of a phenomenon, would be well-placed to tackle such questions. 
 
 
4. Toward an ideal ‘principled mechanistic’ explanation in the context of AD 
 
The paper thus far has indicated that the PM approach aims to strike a middle way between purely mechanistic 
and non-mechanistic options. Taking a cue from NM philosophers, on the mechanistic side, PM aims for some 
systematisation of the elements of mechanistic explanations. On the non-mechanistic side, the goal is to adapt 
hypothesised ‘biological principles’ to mechanistic explanations, where the resultant PM explanation would be 
an augmented but still a coherent whole. 
 
 To start to demonstrate that satisfactory explanations in biology are liable to require appeal to 
principles as well as mechanisms, it might be useful to mention an analogy with ‘reaction mechanisms’ and 
thermodynamic laws in chemistry. When a chemist sets out to explain the reaction between some molecules, 
they detail the reaction mechanism, i.e. the sequence of molecular/atomic steps leading to an overall chemical 
change. But they do not stop there, for they also appeal to thermodynamic laws that ‘govern’ the steps. 
 
 In fact, thermodynamics (e.g. the second law) has been highly formalised in chemistry in the form of 
the notion of change in ‘Gibbs free energy’ (ΔG), “whose sign predicts the direction of reaction, and whose 
magnitude indicates the maximum amount of work realizable from the reaction” (Feinman & Fine, 2004, p. 2). 
As such, thermodynamics can help (i) predict something about the reaction (recall the notion of ‘expectability’ 
from Hint #3 in the previous section) and (ii) provide some sort of quantification for the yield of the reaction. 
These could arguably be achieved without necessarily appealing to the mechanistic details of the reaction. 
However, the notion of ΔG can also (iii) be applied to the details of the reaction mechanism itself to reveal new 
insights. As an example, chemists have used thermodynamic notions of molecules’ lowest free-energy states 
to study the immensely complex mechanism of hydrogen bond formation amongst clusters of water molecules 
(Richardson et al., 2016), allowing them to reveal how the bond formation mechanism itself might be operating 
(see also (Llored, 2011)). 
 
 In today’s cell biology, we have the equivalent of intricate ‘reaction mechanisms’ for phenomena such 
as AD (although perhaps not as systematised as in chemistry), but what is largely missing is the cell biological 
equivalent of thermodynamic laws. This, in essence, is the framework that a PM explanation aims to achieve. 




appeal to principles can augment the power of cell biological explanations. This section embarks on the first 
task, with Sections 5 and 6 taking up the latter lead. 
 
 Here, based on different NM-related accounts (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Bechtel & Richardson, 
2010; Cartwright et al., 2020; Glennan & Illari, 2017), earlier approaches to naturalistic explanations, and also 
research on AD and non-AD mechanistic explanations in the cell biology literature, I propose to develop a 
concise series of criteria for a paradigmatically ‘good’ mechanistic explanation. These criteria could be thought 
of as candidate determinants of the ‘good-making features’ (borrowing from (Newton-Smith, 1981)) of a 
mechanistic explanation. The idea is not to say that fulfilling all the criteria would arrive at an ideal or complete 
explanation in an absolute sense, but I only claim that moving toward fulfilling these criteria, if we can, would 
produce better mechanistic explanations than what we already have. Furthermore, the criteria can be 
presented in the format of a series of ‘tests’, simply to help with determining whether an explanation meets the 
criteria. 
  
• TEST #1: The phenomenon to be explained is set out as unambiguously as possible. 
This first test concerns the explanandum. It is only referring to the phenomenon and is not yet 
concerned with the explanation per se, and is simply appealing to a goal of clear stipulation of that 
which a biologist is to investigate. There is often much work to be done prior to setting out to explain 
a phenomenon in clarifying the biological problem at hand. Such an aim not only helps to avoid 
explanatory irrelevance but could also facilitate consistency amongst investigators and the ease of 
communicating different explanatory angles of the phenomenon. For example, setting out to explain 
‘cell death’ (e.g. apoptosis) is clearer than setting out to explain ‘cellular dysfunction’, without 
stipulating what the ‘dysfunction’ implies. In a sense, an investigator wants to pre-empt the question: 
‘but what exactly are we explaining?’. 
 
• TEST #2: The explanation sets out an environment to situate the mechanism leading to the 
phenomenon and refers to decomposable and detectable parts that constitute the mechanism. 
This test narrows in on two basic epistemic criteria of a mechanistic explanation, namely the context 
and the parts. It starts by locating the environment within which the phenomenon, and the putative 
mechanism underlying it, occur. Stipulating the environment should be an easy task because it directly 
corresponds to the cellular location that researchers choose to study. Furthermore, there are not many 
choices when it comes to the cell: the intracellular space (i.e. the cytoplasm), the membrane, the 
extracellular space, and ‘sub-environments’ relevant to the explanation, for example an organelle such 
as the mitochondrion inside the cytoplasm. 
 The explanation should then stipulate the parts (or entities) of interest. The parts can be 
detected and measured in the stipulated environment(s). Much of cell biology revolves around 
molecular parts such as DNAs, RNAs and proteins, which are themselves composed of smaller 
subparts in the form of nucleic acids, amino acids, etc. There is a reductionist undercurrent in cell 
biology’s reliance on molecular parts for its explanations. The biologist E. O. Wilson explained this as 




(Wilson, 1998, p. 59). Indeed, as already detailed, much of the AD amyloid explanation relies upon a 
cast of molecular parts in the form of proteins. 
 
• TEST #3: The parts represented in the mechanistic model on which the explanation relies are 
organised and have some form of interaction. 
This test concerns quantitative associations amongst the parts. Upon detecting the key parts of a 
mechanism, determining how they are spatiotemporally organised relative to each other and interact 
amongst each other is a rational next step. In the cell, one could have protein–protein, protein–lipid, 
protein–DNA and many other types of interactions. Investigating such interactions could be done at a 
small scale or using what are called ‘interactome’ approaches, which are aimed at providing a 
quantifiable snapshot of the interaction of a greater number of molecules. Determining interactions 
between key parts in a mechanistic model and the resulting explanation may also hint at potential 
interactions with parts in other (ostensibly unrelated) cellular processes, hence aiding in dealing with 
the possible masking effect of parallel mechanisms mentioned in Subsection 2.2. 
 As a lead-up to the next section, consider that if a category of biological principles could be 
hypothesised that might possibly ‘govern’ spatiotemporal interactions in the cell, this could have an 
augmenting role in a PM explanation. More on this later. 
 
• TEST #4: The relevant interacting parts described in the explanation exert some form of change 
on each other via some intermediate means. 
This test stays on the theme of interaction amongst parts but is concerned with the nature of the 
interactions and the changes they bring about. Put differently, it is essentially about the consequences 
of the associations amongst parts, particularly proteins. Why is this important? A cell’s behaviour is 
ultimately mediated through its plethora of proteins, and hence the physicochemical changes that 
proteins exert on each other are crucial. It might often turn out that the mere fact of two protein’s 
interaction could be discovered relatively easily, but the biological significance and change(s) brought 
about by the interaction would take many years to unravel. What also complicates understanding the 
biological significance of protein–protein interactions is that evolution has created a reality whereby 
most proteins associate with only a specific subset of other proteins and are relatively inert to 
interactions with others.8 
 Now, what could help in establishing the nature of the changes exerted by molecular parts on 
each other is to analyse the intermediate means of their interactions, which could themselves be other 
mechanisms (composed of parts, etc.) or things that are not standardly classed as mechanisms, such 
as physicochemical forces. Proteins are thought to interact with each other via various modes of 
electrostatic attraction resulting in changes in protein conformation and/or the addition of chemical 
groups (recall the ‘hyperphosphorylation’ of tau). In this context, a hypothesised category of biological 
principles governing macromolecular interactions could inform the test’s criteria in a PM explanation. 
 
 
8 I am grateful to Gerold Schmitt-Ulms for bringing this point to my attention. See also (Schmitt-Ulms, Mehrabian, 




• TEST #5: The explanation can accurately account for the sequence of cellular changes leading to 
detectable variation in the phenomenon. 
Whilst Tests #2 to #4 focus on changes effected on/by individual parts, this test attempts to bridge the 
parts to the phenomenon by highlighting how a series of changes (effected on/by individual parts) may 
be temporally and causally connected to lead to quantifiable variations in the phenomenon. Indeed, a 
cornerstone of biological investigations is to study natural or artificial variation/change in a 
phenomenon as a crucial way of gleaning details about its underlying mechanism. 
 To help fulfil this explanatory criterion, one or some cellular part(s) should in principle be 
manipulated (by the investigator or by nature itself in the case of ‘natural experiments’), altering the 
phenomenon and/or effecting changes on other parts, and paving the way to determining causal 
relations amongst the parts in the mechanism underlying the phenomenon. Philosophers of science 
are well-familiar with James Woodward’s work on ‘interventions’ (Woodward, 2016). Whilst 
interventions in cell biology certainly have to adhere to various methodological standards, the use of 
‘manipulability’ and ‘intervention’ here are not necessarily committing to the formal constraints of what 
would count as interventions by Woodward’s account. 
 As a case in point, suppose that in a cell culture dish of dying neurons, under certain natural 
conditions, the neurons begin to recover, thus hinting that halting neuronal death in cell culture is 
possible. Hence, we have a variation in the cell death phenomenon. Let us then assume that an 
investigator’s quantifiable overexpression of a certain protein in dying neurons recapitulates the said 
variation in the phenomenon, i.e. it halts neuronal death to a certain degree. This now sets the course 
for researching how, and in what causal sequence of resultant changes, the intervention on (i.e. 
overexpression of) the protein ultimately leads to the variation in the phenomenon. 
 
 These five tests should not be thought of as individually necessary conditions for a productive research 
programme leading to a successful mechanistic explanation, and, collectively, they are not exhaustive 
stipulations for a paradigmatic mechanistic explanation. There could surely be further criteria or more exact 
stipulations for the framework, but the current ones are meant as starting points. Additionally, the tests should 
not be construed as true-or-false propositions. Even when an explanation fulfils the criteria of a test to a certain 
degree, the granularity or depth with which those criteria are fulfilled could always be improved upon with 
refined theoretical work and new empirical findings, and newer questions to investigate could be proposed. 
 
 The tests are also not necessarily meant to be hierarchical, but it makes sense for some of them to 
build on each other. Moreover, a given phenomenon might be explained at least in a rudimentary way even 
when most of these tests are answered in the negative, that is if the mechanistic model being investigated is 
at an early stage of development. But in the case of AD, the mechanistic model and explanation have enough 
detail to be able to engage with the criteria of each test at an appreciable richness. 
 
 Below, each of the tests is applied to the amyloid explanation, marking out specific strengths and 
shortcomings. The point is to systematically ascertain what the explanation might be missing, and how to make 
it more complete. Furthermore, as introduced above, some of the tests might benefit heuristically from a 




• TEST #1: Is the AD phenomenon set out as unambiguously as possible? 
The amyloid explanation has, as one of its endpoints, neuronal damage and cell death (beginning in 
certain parts of the brain, such as the entorhinal cortex), for which a number of cellular processes 
leading to Aβ aggregation and NFT formation have been postulated. As far as one could tell, the AD 
field takes cellular damage as the reference phenomenon to investigate the disease. This cellular 
manifestation of AD is, at the very least, defined in relatively unambiguous terms and communicated 
as such by investigators in the field. One can therefore tentatively say that, for the most part, the 
answer to this test is affirmative. 
 Having said that, what the amyloid explanation is currently missing is an exact account of how 
neuronal death at a single-cell level connects with brain-region-specific damage and how that precisely 
leads to AD’s behavioural symptoms. Thus, there is much work to be done, even though this test is 
being marked as affirmative. 
 
• TEST #2: Does the amyloid explanation set out an environment to situate the underlying AD 
mechanism, and refer to decomposable and detectable parts that constitute the mechanism? 
The amyloid explanation deals within the confines of the environments inside and immediately 
surrounding single neurons. Furthermore, the explanation rests on a number of key protein players 
such as APP and tau, which are detectable in experimental settings and whose amino acid sequences 
are known. Therefore, the answer here is also affirmative. 
 Recall, however, that these tests should not be thought of as true-false propositions. For 
example, what is still missing in the explanation is some account of how, within the densely crowded 
and highly viscous intracellular environment of the cell, large aggregates of, for instance, tau proteins 
can even begin to form and take up significant intracellular volume. This is not a mere data gap in the 
explanation, but a conceptual gap which the explanation should cover. Thus, here again there is much 
work to be done, even though the test is being marked as affirmative. 
 
• TEST #3: Are the parts represented in the model on which the amyloid explanation relies organised 
and in some form of interaction? 
In terms of organisation, neurons (which are the ‘environment’ of the amyloid explanation) are 
quintessential examples of vastly complex network arrangements of proteins, nucleic acids, lipids and 
other molecular ‘parts’. Moreover, the protein players in the explanation are organised into pathways, 
as outlined in Table 1. Additionally, the chain of direct interactions amongst the parts in either of the 
(extracellular) Aβ and (intracellular) tau arms of the explanation are clear and known in some depth. 
However, the interaction of the parts between the two arms of the underlying model is much less clear 
in the explanation (Bloom, 2014; Love, 2001; Rudenko et al., 2019; Tapia-Rojas et al., 2019). Given 
that both the extracellular and intracellular pathways are implicated in the pathobiology of the disease, 
there is strong reason based on the existing model to believe there to be important cross-interactions, 
but there is no indication yet as to their nature. Hence, the tentative answer here for the amyloid 
explanation is negative. The obvious barrier, and perhaps connection, between the two arms is the 
cell membrane, which spatially separates the internal and external cellular milieus. This possibility will 




• TEST #4: Do the relevant interacting parts described in the amyloid explanation exert some form of 
change on each other via some intermediate means? 
The question of this test, it may seem, can easily be answered in the affirmative for the cascade of 
steps that generate the Aβ peptide. For, as detailed in Section 2, the very production of the peptide 
involves changes, e.g. exerted by one part (one of the ‘secretase’ enzymes) on another part (the APP 
protein). But what are the intermediate means? The protein structures and ‘active sites’ (e.g. of the 
secretase enzymes that cleave APP) are known and have been the subject of many studies (Dehury, 
Tang, & Kepp, 2019; Seegar et al., 2017); and yet, in terms of exactly how the interaction takes place, 
we have not progressed much beyond relatively basic appeals to electrostatic interactions and 
hydrogen bonds. Whilst we can detect a change exerted upon a protein by another, the means with 
which the change is exerted is nowhere as intelligible as, for example, detecting the parts themselves, 
their arrangement, etc., and much ground needs to be covered to determine exactly how chemical 
principles, such as electrostatic attraction, are actually operating at the protein and cellular scales (see 
e.g. (Matta, 2006; Zhai, Otani, & Ohwada, 2019)). I will therefore mark the answer here as negative. 
As hinted at earlier, it would be immensely useful if chemical principles of interaction could be 
transformed into a category of principles that would specifically account for biological macromolecular 
interactions. More on this in Section 5. 
 
• TEST #5: Can the amyloid explanation accurately account for the sequence of cellular changes that 
lead to detectable variation in the AD cellular phenomenon? 
Accounting for detectable variation in the sense of increased protein cleavage, fibrillation and 
aggregation certainly occupies a central place within the amyloid explanation. Such variations have 
been painstakingly studied by using, for example, interventions that increase Aβ or tau levels in 
cultured neurons or in mice and detecting resultant changes in other elements of the presumed 
underlying mechanism (i.e. parts, interactions, etc.). In addition, certain familial genetic mutations 
provide natural cases of variability of the implicated protein levels. What is still unclear, however, is 
the certainty and order with which each episode of change can be pinned onto the disease’s timeline. 
As already noted, one of the key open questions in AD research is the extent to which Aβ aggregation 
is causative of the disease phenomenon or if it is protective (Panza et al., 2019), i.e. whether neuronal 
cell death starts to happen before or after Aβ aggregation begins in any appreciable manner. The 
same goes for NFT formation by tau: does it happen before, concomitant with or after plaque 
formation? Therefore, the sequence of changes (i.e. what happens first, what comes next, etc.) cannot 
be definitively assigned as of yet, and hence the answer here is negative. 
 
 
 These tests applied in the context of the amyloid explanation can be said to do two things: first, 
independent of the issue of biological principles, they can systematically help to prioritise which underexplored 
or missing mechanistic element(s) within the explanation should be investigated and how their discovery could 
fit into the broader picture of understanding the phenomenon of interest. Second, regardless of the 
negative/positive assessment of the mechanistic criteria, at least some of the tests could inspire or hint at 




the PM explanation) and lead to new research questions. Moreover, a given biological principle might feed 
back into a particular test that inspired its discovery and help resolve the mechanistic gaps that were identified. 
How principles might achieve these is the topic of the remaining two sections. 
 
 
5. Two AD-relevant biological principles 
 
I will begin by describing two hypothetical biological principles that could be candidates for inclusion in a PM 
investigation of AD. These example principles will help with the discussion in Section 6 where more abstract 
and general aspects of biological principles will be the focus. I should note that proposing and investigating 
even one novel biological principle and determining its empirical impact requires a dedicated research 
programme. 
 
 Be that as it may, I will use two of the paradigmatic tests as a springboard here: Test #3, which had to 
do with the arrangement and interaction of parts, and Test #4, which was centred on interacting parts exerting 
some form of change on each other via intermediate means. I argued that, respectively, a category of biological 
principles governing spatiotemporal interactions in the cell and another category accounting for biological 
macromolecular interactions, could augment our understanding of the criteria picked out in the two tests. To 
this end, I will propose two principles, provisionally termed the ‘principle of cellular synchrony’ and the ‘principle 
of generative protein domains’, each falling under one of the two categories. 
 
5.1. Principle of cellular synchrony 
 
A few years ago I had suggested that the collective vibrations of ‘phospholipids’ (a class of lipid molecules) 
that form the cell membrane may act as a pacemaker or timekeeping source for cellular processes at a 
frequency in the picosecond range (i.e. one-trillionth (10−12) of a second) (Ehsani, 2012). Incidentally, this 
timekeeping proposal bears similarities to observations that were made by physicists studying biological 
systems (Adair, 2002; Fröhlich, 1968), indicating that the focus on vibrational behaviour has a clear lineage in 
biophysics. I should emphasise that this proposal is not related to the circadian rhythm (discussed earlier 
relating to (Bechtel, 2017)), which pertains to the 24-hour timekeeping that happens at an organism level and 
regulates the sleep–wake cycle. Cell membrane vibrations concern an individual cell, and at a time regime that 
is orders of magnitude faster than one second. Additionally, there is no connection between this proposal and 
the pacemaker cells of the heart, which are a group of cells that form an electrical conduction system to control 
the rate of heart muscle contractions in the order of a few seconds. 
 
 There are various methods to attempt to validate the link between cell membrane vibrations and 
timekeeping in the cell. As the evidence stands to-date, the possibility of such a function of the membrane is 
relatively strong (not discussed further). Nevertheless, building on this possibility, one could posit a principle 
of cellular synchrony, which entails that all processes within a cell (e.g. the activity of proteins, intracellular 
transport, DNA transcription, etc.) happen in a synchronised manner and are cyclically coordinated based on 




Such a principle, and the notion of a common timing regime, answer to the fact that cellular processes have a 
mind-boggling level of coordination and interdependence (recall, for example, the earlier discussion of 
mechanisms ‘masking’ each other (Illari, 2011)). Moreover, because membranes are a universal feature of 
cells from all domains of life (Jekely, 2006), this principle would be expected to be operative in any cell. This 
is my first example of a ‘biological principle’. 
 
 Why is this a ‘biological’ rather than a ‘chemical’ principle? To be sure, the inherent vibrations of every 
single phospholipid derive from the molecule’s chemistry. However, when countless phospholipids come 
together in a membrane, encapsulate the contents of the cell, produce physical vibrations in unison, and that 
vibrational frequency is transferred across the volume of the cell to affect all the biochemical processes within 
it, these collectively make the proposed principle a uniquely biological one operative at a cellular level. 
Moreover, the principle could be expanded to entail that in a tissue such as the brain, all adjacent cells, due to 
direct or indirect membrane contact, might potentially have their cellular processes synchronised as well. This 
could be an important consequence of the principle because, just as processes in individual cells are intricately 
coordinated, a collection of neurons and other brain cells also need to be ‘in sync’ in terms of their synaptic 
communication, production of action potential, and many other functions. In AD, for example, the loss of 
synaptic communication (and consequently coordination) between neurons is thought to be a key pathological 
step as the disease progresses (Edwards, 2019). 
 
 Also, in virtue of the above, no cellular mechanism9 could be said to underlie the principle of cellular 
synchrony. That is, cell membrane vibrations are not the result of a network of interacting proteins and other 
molecules in the cell. They essentially happen ‘automatically’ and ‘on their own’, as an empty shell of just cell 
membrane would still have the vibrations. However, the vibrations of each phospholipid in the membrane could 
perhaps be explained with a chemical or molecular mechanistic explanation along with, for example, 
thermodynamic laws. Thus, even if this principle does admit of further explanation, the explanation is unlikely 
to be a purely mechanistic one — appealing as it presumably will to thermodynamic laws — and any 
mechanistic component of the explanation is likely to be at the chemical rather than the biological level. 
 
 Now, on the basis of the temporal synchrony that this principle could entail across cellular processes, 
we might consider it as a member of potential principles of spatiotemporal interactions. Going back to Test #3 
on how the membrane could bridge the extracellular and intracellular facets of the AD amyloid explanation, a 
hypothesis that the principle of synchrony brings forth is that both the Aβ peptide and hyperphosphorylated 
tau might interfere in tandem with the vibrations of the membrane. We know, for example, that extracellular Aβ 
oligomers “destabilize the […] membrane’s structure, induce a generalized increase in membrane permeability, 
and insert themselves into the membrane to form cation-conducting pores” (Wang, Tan, Liu, & Yu, 2016, p. 
1914). It has also been reported that the tau protein forms complexes with phospholipids (Ait-Bouziad et al., 
2017). And, Aβ might in fact directly interact with and facilitate the fibrilization of tau (Vasconcelos et al., 2016). 
 
The interplay of unsynchronised cellular processes and AD pathology, mediated by the membrane 
and both Aβ and tau, would be a possible new path of investigation. This could lead to novel insights on (i) 
 




how the main parts and pathways of the AD mechanistic model could be explained to be connected, and (ii) 
how the pathways interact and influence each other. This is one scenario in which a new biological principle 
could heuristically apply to the elements of a mechanistic explanation, in this case showing one way of allowing 
the AD explanation to satisfy the conditions of Test #3. Furthermore, the principle can independently (and 
without necessarily invoking the mechanistic elements) raise the explanatory possibility that AD could, for 
instance, signal an overall unsynchronised timing amongst cellular processes in a given region of the brain. If 
such a line of investigation were to be pursued, quantifications of the unsynchronised timing of cellular 
processes might also be studied: in light of the loss of synaptic communication and coordination, an AD 
researcher could, for instance, investigate how long certain cellular processes might be ‘off’ relative to each 
other, and if this timing difference would increase as the disease progresses. 
 
5.2. Principle of generative protein domains 
 
A second hypothetical biological principle could relate to the geometry and three-dimensional conformation of 
proteins such as Aβ and tau. In this subsection, I would like to specifically focus on tau, which is taken to be 
an ‘intrinsically disordered’ protein (Sabbagh & Dickey, 2016). 
 
 Since the 1950s, protein structure has been defined in terms of domains or segments that may be of 
(roughly) three flavours: ‘alpha-helical’, ‘beta-sheet’ and ‘disordered’. Approximately a third of human proteins 
are thought to contain disordered segments, and these segments contribute significantly to protein–protein 
interactions and therefore to protein function (Kim & Chung, 2020). A visual representation of how ordered 
versus disordered protein domains can be thought of is presented in Figure 2 on the next page. A persistent 
challenge, however, has been that there is no overarching explanatory theory of what a disordered domain is 
and how it could systematically be conceptualised. 
 
 But what if disordered proteins are not really ‘disordered’ after all? Commentators on the physics of 
‘order’ and ‘chaos’, or ‘patterned’ and ‘patternless’, do not usually entertain a third possibility, one which would 
in principle be neither ordered nor disordered (Crutchfield, 2012). Truly envisioning what a third possibility 
could be may perhaps be beyond human cognitive capacity, but there have been attempts toward such an aim 
(see e.g. (Clouser et al., 2019; Sormanni et al., 2017)). 
 
 Within this context, one could propose a principle of generative protein domains, stating that so-called 
disordered protein domains might possibly be ‘generative’ domains in that they can assume multiple precise 
structures that are appropriate to their immediate cellular environment and interacting partners. The possible 
structures that a disordered domain could assume might be dependent on the complex balance of a number 
of factors, including: (i) the chemical interactions (electrostatic and non-electrostatic) within the protein domain 
itself (amongst its different amino acids) and between different domains of the same or another protein, (ii) the 
geometrical constraints of the protein (e.g. some structural configurations might simply be geometrically 
impossible for the protein macromolecule), and (iii) the physicochemical properties of the cellular fluid/medium 




 I should note that the factors stipulated for this principle could potentially be operative on any protein 
domain, regardless of its ‘orderedness’. However, it is reasonable to assume that for ordered domains (alpha-
helical and beta-sheet), the influence of the first factor (i.e. chemical interactions amongst a domain’s amino 
acids) might be so overwhelming so as to outweigh the contributions of the other two factors. This is due to 
the prevailing notion that the single structure of ordered domains can be entirely explained by chemical 
properties at the protein sequence level (Söding, 2017), and that these domains assume the same ‘constant’ 
structure in most cellular contexts. As a further note, the principle of generative protein domains can be 
assigned to the biological macromolecular interactions category, and, since it is wholly concerned with proteins 




Figure 2. Representations of ordered and disordered proteins. This figure from (Uversky, 2017) depicts a 
multidomain ordered protein (an alpha-helical protein) on the top left and a disordered protein on the top right. 
The structural and conformational rigidity of the domains within these two types of protein structure is compared 
to bricks vs. pasta, respectively. The question, however, is that is a disordered-domain-containing protein — 
such as the tau protein (which is actually entirely disordered) — really without any particularly constant shape 
(like a string of pasta), or is it perhaps ‘structured’ in some other way? Reproduced with permission from Elsevier. 
  
 
 Now, could this principle, similar to the principle of cellular synchrony, also be counted as ontologically 
distinct from cellular mechanistic explanations? I argue that it can, given that it fundamentally concerns the 
internal and external chemistry of proteins, and as such it might only be possible to posit chemical mechanisms 
underwriting it, if at all. Consider that we are not dealing with a small molecule interacting with its surrounding 




potentially many properties that cannot entirely be explained by chemical mechanisms and thermodynamic 
laws (Jiang, Teufel, Jackson, & Wilke, 2018). 
 
 Moving forward, and taking the principle of generative protein domains as governing the structure of 
disordered protein domains, one could posit that in certain cellular milieus, the tau protein may indeed have a 
precise and constant structure (i.e. a constrained structure without any appreciable variance), albeit not alpha-
helical or beta-sheet ordered. One implication is that the tau protein sequence might be able to ‘generate’ 
different three-dimensional structures depending on its hyperphosphorylation status (a geometric and chemical 
change), and/or whether it is in the intracellular fluid or interacting with the membrane (a medium change). 
This could actually also go some way in accounting for the multiple roles that a disordered protein could have 
in the cell (see e.g. (Olivieri et al., 2020)). The generative protein domains principle could thus help to explain 
facets of the behaviour of tau in AD neurons independent of the amyloid explanation. 
 
 At the same time, however, the potential implications of this principle could inform the problem 
highlighted in Test #4. There, a problem was that the current conception of how two proteins interact is tenuous: 
“in terms of exactly how the interaction takes place, we have not progressed much beyond relatively basic 
appeals to electrostatic interactions and hydrogen bonds” (Section 4). Obtaining new insights on the dynamics 
of tau’s structure could lead to clues about its interaction with other ‘ordered’ and ‘disordered’ proteins. The 
principle might also eventually lead to quantifications of the extent to which the interaction between such 
proteins is dictated by electrostatic forces and hydrogen bonds, and how much — as suggested by the 
principle’s stipulations — is shaped by the medium surrounding the proteins and the mutual geometrical 
constraints of their interacting domains. We might thus be able to quantify the strength of tau’s interaction with 
its key interacting protein partners in the AD amyloid explanation. 
 
 The principles of cellular synchrony and generative protein domains are just two examples of potential 
biological principles that could be hypothesised based on the problems at hand. For each of these principles, 
one could ask what parameters (i.e. context-dependent and changeable factors similar to a temperature 
variable in a thermodynamic law) could fine-tune the principle. In the case of the cellular synchrony principle, 
the ‘rigidity’ of the cell membrane could be a possible parameter, whereby the more rigid the membrane, the 
lower its vibrational frequency might be expected to be. The rigidity could be dictated by, for instance, how 
tightly packed the membrane is of phospholipids. In the case of the generative domains principle, potential 
parameters are indeed stipulated in the principle itself, such as the composition or the viscosity of the medium 
surrounding the protein. All such parameters need to be validated experimentally. 
 
 In all, the examples in this section were meant to demonstrate how the discovery of biological 
principles could go hand-in-hand with the elucidation of the mechanistic elements of a mechanistic explanation 
brought about by the paradigmatic tests. Moreover, the two hypothesised principles showed how biological 
principles might have non-mechanistic along with mechanistic effects on the overall explanation: they might 
do independent explanatory work, and they might also act as heuristics for making mechanistic explanations 
more ‘complete’. The next section abstracts away from the specifics of the examples in this section to draw 




6. Biological principles and mechanistic explanations 
 
The examples of the principles of cellular synchrony and generative protein domains can help crystallise some 
general properties about biological principles. Starting with their non-mechanistic effects on the overall 
explanation, one might initially ask how biological principles would fit into the broader notion of scientific laws. 
Indeed, in the special sciences (basically any natural science other than fundamental physics), it is hard to 
come by generalisations that can act as almost universal laws that, as noted previously, are characterised by 
“universality, inviolable necessity, or unrestricted scope” (Craver & Tabery, 2019).10 
 
 As such, philosophers of science usually discuss patterns and generalisations in fields like biology 
under the framework of ceteris paribus laws, i.e. laws that hold when other things are (held) equal. These laws 
are essentially generalisations that admit of various context-dependent exceptions, and therefore can be 
thought of as a category of non-exceptionless generalisations (Fenton‐Glynn, 2016). The discussion of ceteris 
paribus laws traces its history to the economic sciences but has been applied and critiqued in all branches of 
the special sciences. For reasons that will be discussed elsewhere, in this paper the generalisations 
concerning cell biology which I call ‘principles’ approximate what some philosophers of science mean by ceteris 
paribus laws or ‘invariant generalisations’.11 
 
 Some further points also need to be made about the word ‘biological’ in ‘biological principles’. First, 
principles or laws from the broader life sciences could be applied to cell biology. Foremost amongst these are 
evolutionary principles (Linquist et al., 2016), which generally apply at a cell population level. Indeed, many 
forms of generalisations that cell biologists may know as ‘principles’ or ‘laws’ fall within the purview of 
observational patterns or conjectures in (i) evolution (e.g. concerning genetic plasticity (Hannan, 2018)), (ii) 
zoology (e.g. concerning tissue patterning (Barkai & Shilo, 2020)), (iii) ecology or (iv) biogeography, and can 
often have mathematical form. Second, a motivation for the PM framework is to argue that biological principles 
for cellular phenomena should be recognised as being distinct from — but connected to — thermodynamic, 
evolutionary, ecological and other related laws and principles.12 
 
 
10 An example is Newton’s law of universal gravitation. Even then, however, one needs to be cognisant of the effect 
of electrical force between charged bodies (see (Elgin, 2017, p. 25)). 
11 Specifically, as I will argue in subsequent work, a ‘principle’ can be thought of as a generalisation of some 
perceived regularity in the natural system being studied that is not yet at the level of a law claim. If it eventually turns 
out to be an accidental generalisation, for example, based on insufficient evidence at the time it was posited, then it 
could get discarded or modified. One or more principles, over time and with mounting evidence, could be formalised 
into a law claim. See also (Berryman, 2003) for a related analysis concerning laws in population ecology. 
12 Arguments regarding the distinctiveness of biological principles could be varied and draw from many sources. As 
a case in point, Marc Lange, in a chapter on “what would natural laws in the life sciences be”, writes that “a biological 
generalization can possess a distinctive variety of necessity – can be a biological law. Associated with this distinctive 
necessity is a range of invariance under counterfactual antecedents that is broader in some respects than the range 
of invariance exhibited by the fundamental physical laws” (Lange, 2013, p. 83). Beyond broadness, the 
distinctiveness of biological principles can also stem from the uniqueness of cellular phenomena compared to 
physical and chemical phenomena. Of note, the discussion of biological principles could just as well cover organism-
level phenomena, but an in-depth explanation of such phenomena (bearing in mind that an organism is made up of 
a vast number of different cells) would necessarily be much more complex. As such, here I have restricted the scope 




 Having these distinctions at hand, how could biological principles deliver independent explanatory 
work? To begin with, consider, for example, that the principle of cellular synchrony could potentially account 
for the collective non-synchronised behaviour of a group of adjacent neurons in AD patients without referencing 
any particular mechanistic explanation, such as the amyloid explanation. The principle could stipulate a 
common reaction timing regime for some number of cells and, if an investigator so chooses, ‘explain’ AD 
cellular phenomena completely non-mechanistically. This line of study could also facilitate the prediction and 
‘expectability’ (Deulofeu & Suárez, 2018) of what might happen in the brain as the disease progresses.13 
 
 This brings to mind the way in which thermodynamic laws allow a chemist to feel confident, to a certain 
extent, about what to expect before a reaction is initiated. This does not mean that thermodynamic laws would 
necessarily lead to the exact prediction of a reaction’s outcome (although that is certainly an ultimate goal), 
but rather whether to simply expect, for example, the reaction to be endothermic or not. Importantly, the 
predictive power facilitated by biological principles might additionally make the explanation more quantitative, 
as was described for the two examples: the principle of cellular timekeeping could lead to measurements in 
cellular process time differences, and the principle on disordered protein domains could lead to better 
quantifications of the strength of protein–protein interactions. 
 
 Moving next to the mechanistic explanatory effects of biological principles, recall from Section 4 that 
at least some of the mechanistic criteria picked out by the paradigmatic tests could in theory be governed by 
one or more hypothesised biological principles. The principles could help general information to bear on the 
mechanistic explanation and thus be utilised to (i) understand its various facets, such as the nature of the parts 
or their interactions (as the generative protein domains principle did for protein structure), and (ii) move toward 
the resolution of the potentially missing elements of the mechanistic explanation (as the cellular synchrony 
principle did to bridge the extracellular and intracellular facets of the amyloid explanation). 
 
 The mechanistic explanatory effects of principles, I would argue, might complement and fit into at least 
a segment of current NM investigations, such as the principles of organisation (or design principles) that were 
alluded to earlier (Bechtel, 2017). However, to what extent this generalises across NM-related investigations 
is a matter of debate. As quoted in Section 3, Cartwright and colleagues are of the opinion that a mechanism’s 
‘regular behaviour’ “is what it takes for some set of principles that govern the features of M’s parts in their 
arrangement in M all to be instanced together” (Cartwright et al., 2020, p. 18). On the other hand, Beate Krickel 
argues that “the new mechanists could in principle accept that […] the interactions between mechanistic 
components are governed by laws (which they usually do not) but that it does not follow that laws or 
expectability adds any explanatory power to a mechanistic explanation” (Krickel, 2020, p. 8). This paper’s 
arguments, however, suggest that biological principles have the potential to increase the explanatory power 
of mechanistic explanations of cellular phenomena in a heuristic manner. Furthermore, the principles 
themselves might independently explain certain facets of the target phenomenon, thereby increasing the 
explanatory power of the overall explanation (which I have called the PM explanation). 
  
 
13 There is pertinent discussion to be had about the independent explanatory work of biological principles and the 




To recap, the goal of the PM framework, after having outlined what a paradigmatic mechanistic 
explanation could be, is to discover and apply biological principles that are operative in a biological cell. The 
principles could have independent explanatory power, aiding in prediction and expectability. Biological 
principles could also make various components of the mechanistic explanation more complete, thereby also 





In this paper, following a review of the significant problems faced by the Alzheimer’s research field, I argued 
that various strands of clinical evidence point to the conclusion that the existing and widely-accepted amyloid 
cascade mechanistic explanation appears to be fundamentally incomplete. In this context, I then proposed that 
a theoretical framework called ‘principled mechanism’ (PM) has the potential to inspire new sets of empirical 
questions and novel avenues of investigation that can take a given mechanistic explanation at any stage of 
development as its starting point. PM is a two-pronged framework: on the one hand, using a short series of 
‘tests’, it systematically compares different components of the mechanistic explanation against a paradigmatic 
set of criteria, and hints at various ways of making the mechanistic explanation more complete. On the other 
hand, it makes an appeal for the discovery and application of ‘biological principles’ relevant to the phenomenon 
being explained. Next, I detailed two hypothetical biological principles, one having to do with ‘time’ at the 
cellular level and the other concerning the structure of ‘disordered’ protein domains, and how they could each 
inform and improve different aspects of the amyloid explanation of AD. Using these examples, I argued that 
biological principles are ‘principles’ since they approximate what some philosophers mean by ceteris paribus 
laws or ‘invariant generalisations’, and ‘biological’ because they are operative at and specific to the level of a 
biological cell. Such principles could aid in several ways, such as augmenting different facets of the 
mechanistic explanation itself but also allowing further independent nomological explanation of the 
phenomenon. Whilst this strategy can be complementary to certain New Mechanist approaches, an important 
distinction of the PM framework is its equal attention to the explanatory utility of biological principles. 
 
 Overall, PM can help to move cell biological investigations from what might be called a generally 
‘mechanistic-descriptive’ state (the status quo) to a ‘mechanistic-nomological’ paradigm, entailing theoretic 
biological principles alongside mechanistic accounts. If the purpose of an AD research programme, in our 
case, is to arrive at a deeper form of biological explanation toward effective treatments, and in doing so 
introduce the field to hitherto uninvestigated paths of enquiry, then the PM approach can be useful in making 
the current AD amyloid model and resultant explanation much more adequate-for-purpose (see (Parker, 
2020)). Moreover, the PM framework could just as easily be applied to other biomedical domains, such as 
mechanistic explanations in cancer research, diabetes or cardiovascular disease, but also explanations for 
physiological cellular phenomena. 
 
 Ultimately, and notwithstanding the issues of the importance or impact of PM, a broader goal of the 
case study is to show that what is perceived by some to be a fragmentation between analytic philosophy and 
biomedicine is artificial and unhelpful, and that progress can be made when philosophical approaches are 
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